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I. INTRODUCTION
In their book, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It, Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley argue that patent law should be tailored to industry characteristics.1
They then explore doctrinal mechanisms by which courts can and should take up
the laboring oar to accomplish the necessary tailoring. Burk and Lemley explore
possibilities for industry-sensitive adjudication at numerous points throughout the
patent lifecycle—from patent acquisition through claim interpretation to
remedies.2 Essentially absent (or present only in faint echoes) from their catalog of
current and potential “policy levers” for the courts are infringement exemptions.
The absence is striking in light of the fact that copyright law, which has been
much more prone than patent law to legislative accommodation to particular
industries,3 nonetheless retains a robust judicial policy lever at the infringement
stage—the fair use doctrine.4 Though striking, the lack of discussion is not at all
surprising. Patent law has no fair-use-type doctrine and the “research exemptions”
that exist are either very narrow5 or available only in highly specific
circumstances.6
In this Article, I will argue that a fair-use-type infringement exemption
should take its place in patent law’s toolbox of policy levers and propose specific
factors that should govern such an exemption.7
A. The Noncontextual Focus of Patent Doctrine
Particularly in the United States, policing the scope of patent rights has been,
at least in principle, a highly front-loaded enterprise, in which the patent scope
determination is intentionally divorced from the context of infringement. An
extensive set of patent validity doctrines, including limits on patentable subject
matter;8 the requirements of utility,9 novelty,10 and nonobviousness;11 the written
1. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
2. Id. at chs. 9‒10.
3. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35–63 (2006). For an updated discussion of
copyright legislative history, see Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1–7 (2010).
4. For an excellent recent overview and analysis of the fair use doctrine in copyright law, see
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
5. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that university research
did not qualify for the “very narrow and strictly limited” common law research exemption).
6. See 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) (2006) (exemption for research related to FDA approval). See also
Katherine J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current
and Future Technical Progress, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH (Peter Yu
ed., 2006).
7. In this effort I will build on the seminal work on “patent fair use,” Maureen A. O’Rourke,
Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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description, enablement, and best mode requirements;12 and the requirement of
definite claims13 have served as a series of “doors”14 through which a prospective
patentee must pass to obtain patent protection. The perspective of the “person
having ordinary skill in the art,” or PHOSITA, has been the primary mechanism
by which the hurdles to obtaining patent protection are adjusted to particular
technological areas.15 At least until recently, once a patent was obtained, patent
exclusivity was unyielding: injunctions were virtually certain at the end of a
successful patent infringement suit16 and compulsory licenses were scorned.17 An
up-front-focused system has several purported advantages. Focusing the debate
over patent rights at the front end is intended to bring certainty and, similarly to
property rights in other contexts, to provide secure rewards to those who invest in
technology and thus facilitate a market.18
Of course, this system has never been as simple as the up-front doctrinal
focus suggests. The validity of patent claims is commonly challenged at the point
of enforcement during litigation.19 Though supposedly independent of the context
of infringement, claim interpretation is also a ubiquitous subject of dispute in
litigation.20 On the infringement side, the doctrine of equivalents developed to
ensure that patentees were not deprived of their rewards by “unscrupulous
copyists”21 or, in more recent iterations, by unforeseeable and tangential
12. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
13. Id.
14. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) vacated in part sub nom. Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) and aff’d sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of the
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent
Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 438 (1966) (coining the name “Mr. PHOSITA”).
16. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (describing the Federal
Circuit’s approach to injunctions in patent cases). The Supreme Court in eBay, id. at 394, softened this
rule to some extent in some circumstances as discussed further infra.
17. See, e.g., Colleen M. Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857–64 (2003); Joseph A.
Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275 (discussing the
history of compulsory licensing in the United States).
18. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972). For discussions of the debate over the
merits of “property rules” and “liability rules” in intellectual property, see, for example, JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009);
Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV.
783 (2007); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); see also MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Because the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the
concept of property,’ the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged.”) vacated 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
19. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §19.02 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009) and many references therein.
21. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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technological developments.22 Nonetheless, the basic conception of a system of
up-front barriers followed by secure rights is well ensconced.23
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, there began to be widespread
dismay over the state of the patent system.24 A number of factors contributed to
the sense that something had gone wrong. Globalization of the system under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) pitted (or at least seemed to pit) patent rights against critical public
health interests.25 Patent protection expanded into subject areas, such as business
methods, software, and biotechnology, in which it was more difficult to define
22. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
23. For discussions and critiques of the Federal Circuit’s bright line “formalistic” approach,
see, for example, Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1142–51 (2008) (describing the “new formalism of patent law” and the
treatment of patent validity and infringement as conceptually separate and “binary” determinations);
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism,
20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
24. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (describing recommendations for proper balance
between competition, law and policy in the patent context); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADEMICS, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004), and references therein; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998)
(describing underuse of scarce resources resulting from patent privatization); Adam B. Jaffe & Josh
Lerner, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (2006) (critiquing
Jaffe and Lerner for their emphasis on patent invalidity and pointing out other potential sources of
problems with the patent system).
25. See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2829–39 (2006) (describing the overly simplistic conception of “intellectual property
globalization” as a binary analysis that considers only protection of knowledge and consumer access
while ignoring social welfare maximization); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21–22 (2004) (describing how the TRIPS agreement encourages
expansion of intellectual property rights, but keeps deregulation subject to WTO, which in turn
increases the price of end products); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The
State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 511–14 (2005) (describing the significance of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration in the TRIPS Agreement, which seems to shed light on the intent of the TRIPS
agreement to provide for public health needs); Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 369, 386–410 (2006) (discussing how developing countries might use the TRIPS
Agreement to move forward); see also Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research
Program, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005) (discussing the impact of TRIPS on biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals); Symposium, Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Accommodating and Reconciling
Different National Levels of Protection, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109 (2007) (collecting articles discussing
the impact of intellectual property agreements on public health and agriculture); Symposium,
Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZO J. INT. & COMP. L. 239,
(2003) (collecting articles discussing the impacts of intellectual property agreements on indigenous
cultures, plants, and medicines).
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rights than it had been in the paradigmatic chemical and mechanical fields.26 These
and other factors led to a burgeoning of the sheer number of patents the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was required to consider.27
Technological changes increased the importance of both cumulative innovation
and complex products, lending greater salience to overlapping patent rights.28
Innovation paradigms are also evolving, with user innovation, open innovation,
and collaborative and open source approaches playing increasingly important
roles.29 Rather than purchasing products over which the patent rights are
“exhausted” by the sale,30 consumers increasingly are licensees (and hence
potential infringers) with ongoing obligations to patent holders.
Besides leading to a sense, at least in many quarters, of a patent system run
amok, these changes drove a wedge between industries, since the changes played
out in technology-specific ways.31 In response, proposals for reform abounded.
Legislation was introduced repeatedly in Congress and, as Burk and Lemley
explain, repeatedly was stymied by opposing pressures from different industry
sectors.32
With the legislature at an impasse, the courts—particularly the Supreme
Court33—and the PTO stepped in beginning in the 2000s with attempts to rein in
26. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18, at 245–46 and references therein.
27. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005).
28. There is a large and contentious literature on this topic, which is reviewed recently (and
skeptically) in Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119
YALE L.J. 384 (2009).
29. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 861 (2009) and references therein.
30. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (reaffirming that the
patent exhaustion doctrine precludes a patent holder from asserting a claim against a third-party
purchaser).
31. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1.
32. Id. See also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1341 (2009). Note, however, that at this writing there is renewed optimism regarding the
potential for passage of substantive patent reform legislation. See Patent Reform Act of 2011 S. 23,
112th Cong. § 5 (as passed by the Senate, Mar. 8, 2011). The current legislation would not provide the
kind of ex post contextually sensitive enforcement advocated here, however.
33. See Quanta, 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (reaffirming that the patent exhaustion doctrine precludes
a patent holder from asserting a claim against a third-party purchaser); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (rejecting a rigid requirement that obviousness be demonstrated by evidence
of a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine” prior art references); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 456 (2007) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of infringement provision
involving component parts of a patented product manufactured domestically but assembled and sold
abroad); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2006) (holding a party is not
required to break a license agreement “before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that standard principles of equity apply when granting injunctive
relief in patent disputes); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006) (finding
that a patent does not automatically confer market power); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
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perceived over-patenting. Commentators have also been prolific with suggestions
for improving “patent quality.”34
Shortly before this Essay went to press, on September 16, 2011, the LeahySmith America Invents Act was signed into law.35 The legislation enacts some farreaching changes, such as establishing a version of a “first-to-file” system36 and
significantly expanding post-grant review.37
With important exceptions, to which I will return, the reform proposals and
recent judicial and legislative interventions have maintained the focus on better
defining the ex-ante scope of patent exclusive rights.38
One important example of this focus is the Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR
v. Teleflex,39 in which the Court arguably raised the bar to patentability by
recognizing that at least some level of creativity is the province of the ordinary
artisan.40 More recently, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have moved to
rein in the scope of patentable subject matter, particularly with regard to the
interpretation of the ban on the patenting of “abstract ideas” which is crucial to
determining the scope of patent rights in business methods and software.41 The
Federal Circuit had adopted a virtually unbounded “useful, concrete, and tangible
Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for choosing
not to decide this case and supporting a more restrictive view of patentable subject matter); Merck
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) (holding that “the use of patented
compounds in preclinical studies is protected” and is not infringement in most circumstances). See also
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 273 (2002).
34. One rough measure of the interest in the topic is that a LexisNexis search in the US Law
Reviews and Journals database yields 402 hits for the phrase “patent quality” (search conducted on
May 4, 2010) while there were only 22 such hits prior to 2000.
35. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
36. Id. at § 3.
37. Id. at § 6.
38. To be sure, commentators have debated when, as a matter of procedure and
administrability, it is best to expend resources to determine the scope of patent rights definitively. See,
e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent
Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 N.W. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). These discussions still generally presume a
conceptual separation between the definition of patent scope and the context of infringement,
however. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, supra note 23 at 1147 (describing the Federal Circuit’s “rigid
conceptual separation” between infringement and validity determination). Perhaps closest in spirit to
the approach I advocate here are recent proposals for a return to a central claiming regime. See, e.g.,
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009); Burk & Lemley, supra
note 20. These proposals still assume, however, that there is a proper scope of patent exclusivity, as
against all comers, even if it is most desirable as a practical and administrative matter to determine
that scope in light of the accused product or process.
39. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
40. Id. at 421.
41. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct.. 3218 (2010).
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result” test for patentable subject matter.42 Heeding signals of discontent with
such a broad approach to patentable subject matter from at least some Supreme
Court justices, the PTO began to issue more patentable subject matter rejections
and the Federal Circuit moved to narrow its approach.43 The Supreme Court
addressed the issue in 2010.44 While rejecting the Federal Circuit’s attempt to
enshrine a specific “machine or transformation of matter” test for unpatentable
“abstract ideas,”45 the Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, rejected the overly
permissive “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test, and reaffirmed its
traditional concerns about the patenting of abstract ideas. While there was no
majority for a categorical ban on business method patents, four justices would
have banned them,46 while another four expressed the point of view that business
method patents “raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect
validity” and suggested that it might be possible to craft a categorical rule against
patenting some (as-yet-unspecified) category of business methods.47 The PTO has
also made efforts to improve up-front quality control through measures such as
“second pair of eyes” review 48 and its experimental “peer-to-patent” program.49
The Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence reflects various
attempts to establish an up-front clarity for the scope of patent rights, including
the focus on the specification and prosecution history as sources of claim
interpretation,50 the ill-fated attempt to use dictionaries to establish claim term
meanings,51 the downplaying of “extrinsic evidence” and of the factual
underpinnings of claim interpretation,52 and the insistence that claim meaning be
established independently of the product or process that is accused of
infringement.53 Recent expansions in the written description54 and utility55
42. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
43. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bilski, 545 F.3d 943; In re Nuijten,
515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
44. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218.
45. Id. at 3226–27.
46. Id. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 3229. The Supreme Court will revisit the patentable subject matter question in the
currently pending case of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., No. 10-1150.
48. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality
One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 734–35 (2006)
(describing the PTO’s “second pair of eyes” review of business method patent applications).
49. See PEER TO PATENT, http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
50. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
51. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24; Texas Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
52. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–19; Cybor Corp. v. Fas Technologies, 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc). But see Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473–78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Federal
Circuit for adopting a de novo review standard for claim construction).
53. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). See 5A DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[1][b] (2010).
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doctrines similarly focus on reining in overpatenting at the front end.
The long-running back-and-forth between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court concerning the contours of the doctrine of equivalents can also be
seen largely as a colloquy over the extent to which claim scope can and should be
set in stone at issuance.56 While the doctrine eventually established recognizes the
theoretical possibility of a need to encompass activity beyond the scope of the
literal claims,57 the foreseeability approach ensures that cases applying the doctrine
will be few and far between.58
Unfortunately, the results of the focus on up-front clarity have not been
encouraging. Claim construction, for example, remains a mess, with the Federal
Circuit disagreeing with the district courts in a large number of cases.59 Validity is
routinely disputed in litigation, though it is possible that the recently expanded
post-grant review procedures will improve the situation.60 In some industries,
notably in information technology, claim scope uncertainty appears to limit the
effectiveness of patents, except in portfolios.61
54. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
55. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) supplemented, 64 F.3d 675
(Fed. Cir. 1995) and rev’d, 520 U.S. 17, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 137 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1997) and adhered to, 114
F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc). The doctrine of equivalents imposes infringement liability when an allegedly infringing product
or process does not fit literally within a patent’s claims but would be considered “insubstantially
different” by a PHOSITA. For example, an older case considered seminal to the development of the
modern doctrine of equivalents is Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). In that case the Court
held that a freight car with an octagonal cross-section infringed a patent claiming a car in the shape of
a frustum of a cone. Essentially, the Court held that an octagonal cross-section was equivalent to the
claimed circular cross-section in terms of its technological function. More recent cases largely confine
the scope of the doctrine of equivalents to equivalents that would have been unforeseeable at the time
of patenting, at least for claims that have been amended during patent prosecution. Since many, if not
most, claims are amended, this is a significant cabining of the doctrine.
57. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740.
58. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59
STAN. L. REV. 955, 977–78 (2007).
59. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is
Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim
Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 215 (2008). Michael Saunders, A Survey of
Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215 (2007).
60. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, supra note 38; LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). It is unclear how effective the
new proceedings will be at reducing validity challenges during infringement litigation, given that
proceedings must be instituted within nine months of patent grant.
61. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18; Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in
Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19
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Thus, while there is much to be said for well-defined patent scope,
experience demonstrates that there are important limitations, both theoretical and
practical, to an entirely up-front approach. These limitations include the
unpredictability of technology, and hence the inability to determine a priori how
much downstream innovation a particular claim will be deemed to encompass62 or
how intertwined a particular patented invention will become with other “pieces”
of technology;63 the fact that patented technology, especially in some industries, is
employed in contexts in which the spillover effects of exclusive rights vary
widely;64 and the inability to determine whether a particular invention might
otherwise be independently invented and disseminated by another inventor before
the expiration of the twenty-year patent term.65 Commentators have also
questioned the efficiency of investing in clearly determining property rights up
front, in light of the very large fraction of patents that are never licensed, traded,
or enforced (a clear distinction from real and personal property).66 Some have
even suggested reverting to a registration system for patents in light of the
difficulties in examining patents at issuance.67
These limitations, which are very real, are in some respects the flip side of
the frequently invoked concern with hindsight bias68 (and the less frequently
(2008); Stuart Graham, Robert Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY. TECH. L.J. 1255, 1321–22
(2009) (less than one-quarter of D&B software start-up companies do patent searches, while about
thirty percent of venture-backed software companies do so); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005); Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents,
Venture Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 RES. POL’Y 201, 203–04 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract_id=802806. (software start-ups do not do patent
searches).
62. Patent jurisprudence recognized this issue early on, particularly in discussions of the scope
of patentable subject matter. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. 62, 113 (1853).
63. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 24, for a discussion of the potential for
“anticommons” problems with upstream patenting.
64. For example, an invention may serve both as a commercial product (e.g. a pharmaceutical
or diagnostic test) and as a research tool. The implications of exclusive rights may be quite different in
the two contexts. For a discussion of this distinction, see Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator
Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237
(2009).
65. The Federal Circuit has at times considered near-simultaneous invention to be indicative
of obviousness and at other times declined to do so. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS, 5.05[7] (2010); Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 713 F.2d 693, 698 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
66. Lemley, supra note 61.
67. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present PatentObtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003).
68. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1999) abrogated by In re Gartside, 203
F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006); Gregory Mandel, Patently
Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue before the Supreme Court in KSR v.Teleflex, 9 YALE
J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007).
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invoked, but equally important, countervailing attribution error69). While hindsight
bias and the attribution error arise because of the difficulty in truly appreciating
the past,70 the failings of a focus on ex ante boundary setting arise from the
generally more severe difficulties in anticipating the future of technological
evolution. The quest for ex ante certainty in intellectual property rights is doomed
to failure. Nothing in our experience with real or personal property can really
compare to the radical uncertainty that is endemic to patent law. While there may
be occasional situations in which the value of a piece of real property drastically
changes as a result of, say, a discovery of valuable minerals, a decision to build a
shopping mall down the street (or even an economic recession), uncertainty
moves from the periphery to the center when it comes to intellectual property.
Moreover, the overlapping nature of patent rights dramatically increases the
potential for windfalls and the extent to which windfalls spill over to implicate the
future of innovation.
Given the important implications of technological unpredictability, one
might expect patent law to have developed a robust set of ex post doctrines to
deal with it.71 This has not been the case. Where such doctrines have been

69. See, e.g., Joseph S. Miller, Hoisting Originality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 485 n. 164 (2009)
(noting “the fundamental attribution error, according to which people tend to overestimate the power
of personality, and underestimate the power of situation, in explaining human behavior”); Bradford S.
Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of
Creativity in International Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613 (2005).
70. Well-recognized difficulties of this type in patent law include: i) the difficulty in
determining, especially at the time of examination, whether a particular invention is nonobvious or
whether it is simply part of an ongoing stream of routine advances. See, e.g., articles within Business Law
Forum: Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323–598 (2008); and ii)
the imprecision of language, and hence the inability to ensure that claim terms will be interpreted as
conceived of by the patentee and examiner at the time of examination. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (discussing limitations of
language as a rationale for the doctrine of equivalents). These difficulties are exacerbated by the
inability of non-technically-trained judges and juries to capture accurately the perspective of the
PHOSITA. About this quandary, Learned Hand, writing in 1911, opined:
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which
makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to
pass upon such questions as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of the
resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capable of passing upon such facts, e.g.,
in this case the chemical character of Von Furth’s so-called “zinc compound,” or the
presence of inactive organic substances. In Germany, where the national spirit eagerly
seeks for all the assistance it can get from the whole range of human knowledge, they do
quite differently. The court summons technical judges to whom technical questions are
submitted and who can intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among
testimony upon matters wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder
along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the
administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by
provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1911).
71. The unpredictability I focus on here is distinct from a form of unpredictability that is
recognized in patent doctrine—the concept of “unpredictable arts.” See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The
Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278 (2008) (describing the
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developed in the past, for the most part mere vestiges of them remain today.
Thus, as already discussed, the doctrine of equivalents plays very little role in
today’s infringement determinations.72 Doctrines that might cabin the
enforcement of patent rights have fared much worse. The exemption for
experimental use of patented inventions, with the exception of a statutory
exemption focused on dealing with regulatory delay in the pharmaceutical context,
has shrunk arguably to the point of nonexistence in Federal Circuit case law.73 The
so-called “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” which allows courts to find
noninfringement in cases where an accused product or process fits within the
claim scope despite radical change by the infringer, is occasionally acknowledged
but never applied.74 The Federal Circuit has clarified that there is no “de minimis”
exception to patent infringement.75 The doctrine of patent misuse is rarely
successful at the Federal Circuit; moreover, what it reaches outside of antitrust
violations is increasingly unclear.76 Unlike some other jurisdictions, the United
States has no recent history of working requirements77 and makes very limited use
of compulsory licensing.78

implications for “unpredictable arts” for patent disclosure doctrine). The doctrine of “unpredictable
arts” recognizes the ex ante unpredictability of success for inventive efforts in some arenas, whereas I
focus here on the unpredictability of how technology will progress after invention.
72. Allison & Lemley, supra note 58.
73. For a review of both the general and specific exemptions, see Katherine J. Strandburg, The
Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in
2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 107, 112–16 (Peter Yu ed., 2006).
74. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 128; Roche Palo Alto, L.L.C. v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d
1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has
never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). In Scripps
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991) clarified on denial of
reconsideration, 89-1541, 1991 WL 523489 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1991) and overruled by Abbott Laboratories
v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) the Federal Circuit considered a reverse doctrine of
equivalents argument in a case involving “human Factor VIII:C, a complex protein that occurs
naturally in normal blood and is essential to the clotting of blood.” Id. at 1568. The patentee had
discovered a process for isolating factor VIII:C from blood plasma to a high level of purity. The
product claims at issue encompassed factor VIII:C of a particular purity and potency. The accused
infringer, Genentech, had produced factor VIII:C using a recombinant process that did not involve
the purification of naturally occurring factor VIII:C. Genentech argued that its recombinantly
produced factor VIII:C was non-infringing under the reverse doctrine of equivalents because it was
“changed ‘in principle’” from the patented substance. Id. at 1581. It argued that “the specific activities
and purity that are obtainable by recombinant technology exceed those available by the Scripps
process.” Id. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on infringement,
suggesting that the reverse doctrine of equivalents might apply in these circumstances, depending
upon the facts. Unfortunately for those favoring revival of the doctrine, the case settled and the issue
was never brought to trial.
75. See, e.g., Abbott Labs, 566 F.3d at 1299.
76. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2010); Robin C. Feldman, The
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 425–31 (2003).
77. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2010).
78. Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement,
Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1351–55 (2008).
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Of course, skeptics will respond to arguments in favor of contextual
infringement exemptions with a number of critiques. First, one might argue that
incorporating infringement exemptions and defenses into patent law will
undermine the certainty of rights that is the aim of the emphasis on defined patent
scope. Second, one might argue that exemptions and defenses will undermine
incentives to invent, disclose, and disseminate (through commercialization) new
technology.79 Both of these arguments have some appeal, but neither is sufficient
to outweigh the potential benefits of appropriately tailored post hoc policy levers.
Given the current state of things, it is not at all clear that much certainty
would be lost by adopting a set of exemptions and defenses sensitive to the
context of an alleged infringement. In practice, as already discussed, the validity
and scope of a patent are not finally determined until the outcome of litigation is
known. If an infringement exemption can do a reasonably predictable job of
improving social welfare at the back end, it may be worth some additional blurring
of the already muddy boundaries of patent rights. If we institute a fair-use-type
infringement exemption, both inventors and users of patented technology will
naturally incorporate the potential for such exemptions into their planning
(including licensing negotiations). Indeed, the primary distinction between the
present situation and one with a robust system of exemptions is not really between
ex ante certainty and ex post adaptability, but between a system that recognizes
the significance of the context in which patented technology is used and one that
does not.
The potential effects of contextualized infringement determinations on
incentives are also insufficient grounds to reject these potential policy levers
outright. First, as the example of the doctrine of equivalents shows, it is possible
to use ex post doctrines to enhance a patentee’s position as well as to weaken it.80
Moreover, any cabining of patent rights—whether through patentable subject
matter, obviousness, utility, or any other doctrine—in principle reduces some
kinds of incentives. On the flip side, any expansion of patent rights—via any
doctrine—in principle adds to the deadweight loss of exclusivity. The point of
using doctrines as policy levers,81 however, is to get beyond this standoff to
consider questions such as “Incentives to do what?” or “What specific decreased
incentives in exchange for what particular social benefits?”82

79. For discussions of the traditional incentive theories of patenting, see, for example, Roger
D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 78–80 (2001);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and
the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).
80. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 17–18 (2009) (discussing implications of assessing equivalency at time of infringement).
81. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1642–48
(2003).
82. A similar argument responds to any concerns about the effects of implementing a “fair-
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Instituting ex post exemptions and defenses is one way to tailor patent rights
to these more specific questions. So, for example, where the increase in incentives
provided by enforcing patent rights in a particular context is small relative to the
costs of exclusivity or the social cost of the additional incentives is particularly
large, an exemption or defense can carve out specific types of uses, using a scalpel
rather than a cleaver to shape a socially beneficial patent scope.
Allowing more flexibility at the time of infringement would also take the
pressure off of doctrines such as patentable subject matter and claim construction.
For example, I have argued elsewhere for a “business method use” exemption,
which would avoid the difficulties inherent in determining, from abstract claim
language, whether a particular claimed invention “is” a business method.83
Similarly, I have argued that a research-use exemption can avoid the need to
determine whether a particular invention “is” a research tool in the abstract.84
Such ex ante (and unavoidably abstract) determinations would be necessary to
implement patentable subject matter exclusions, but are not necessary to
implement use exemptions. Almost by definition, an infringement exemption can
account for the fact that different uses of patented technology have different
social costs and benefits. Neither social nor private costs and benefits are all-ornothing quantities.
One important exception to the present dearth of ex post policy levers in
patent law arises out of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v.
MercExchange.85 There, a unanimous Supreme Court overturned a Federal Circuit
rule that virtually guaranteed an injunctive remedy for infringement.86 The Court
ruled instead that the grant of an injunction is a discretionary measure decided
after considering a “well-established” four-factor test, taking into account whether
the plaintiff can establish “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
use-type” exemption on ex ante licensing transactions. The value of patent rights directly affects the
outcome of licensing negotiations. Uncertainty in the scope of rights affects transaction costs. To the
extent that a fair-use-type exemption increases uncertainty it will increase transaction costs. But a
carefully designed exemption may not lead to a large increase in transaction costs overall. This is
because an exemption will clarify rights in some instances (i.e., it will be possible to predict with
reasonable certainty that there is no liability even if the scope of the patent claims is uncertain), have
no effect in many cases (where there is clearly infringement and clearly no exemption), and have only
a minor effect in many other circumstances (where there is already a high degree of uncertainty as to
the scope of the rights).
83. Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method User Exemption to Patent
Infringement? 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 248–50 (2008).
84. Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 29, at 500.
85. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
86. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d. 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Because the
‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property,’ the general rule
is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”), rev’d
sub nom. EBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
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the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”87 The justices differed
as to the extent to which this test aimed to take account of changes in the
innovation environment,88 but lower courts have relied on the case to provide
leeway to take account of the effects that patent injunctions can have on complex,
interrelated technologies, particularly in dealing with nonpracticing entities.89
Besides exercising discretion with respect to the granting of injunctions, courts
have begun to award ongoing royalties—which have many of the same effects as
compulsory licenses.90
Of course, after eBay, one must ask whether more is needed. Is the discretion
now afforded to courts at the remedies stage sufficient to provide ex post
contextual policy levers where they are desirable? There are three basic reasons
why the answer to this question is “no.” First, as mentioned above, the eBay
factors are not tailored to promote innovation. There is no particular reason to
think that courts applying them will make the most socially beneficial choices
about when to grant (or not to grant) injunctive relief. Thus, at the very least, it
would be desirable to explore factors that courts should consider in making the
decision. Second, there are reasons to anticipate specific types of market failures in
patent licensing that are not illuminated by the eBay test. Many of these parallel
those that have been advanced to justify fair use in copyright law. Third, there are
situations in which the social costs of exclusivity in a particular context simply
outweigh the social benefits of the additional patent incentive provided by
infringement liability in that context, such that use in that context should be
permitted without conditions. The ex ante doctrines of patentable subject matter,
nonobviousness, and so on cannot identify these situations.
The lower courts’ responses to the eBay ruling demonstrate that district court
judges, at least, find it useful to have some mechanism for ex post tailoring at their
disposal. The extent to which courts have grasped at this slim reed of ex post
tailoring power raises the question whether there might be other and better ways
to design a set of “policy levers” to be applied at the time of infringement. The
rest of this Article considers that question. Part II reviews a previous proposal for
“patent fair use” and discusses how social and technological changes since that
proposal was made have bolstered the case for a fair-use-type exemption and
provided insights into how it should be designed. Part III discusses proposals to
87. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
88. Compare id. at 394–95 (Roberts, J., concurring), with id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
89. See, e.g., Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of
Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67 (2009).
90. See, e.g., Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(majority and concurrence debating whether ongoing royalties constitute a compulsory license). See
also H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and
Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661 (2010).
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deal with some of the issues discussed in Part II either by beefing up existing
doctrine or by some form of an independent inventor defense and concludes that
those proposals are less desirable than a general fair-use-type defense. For similar
reasons, the prior user defense enacted in the America Invents Act is also an
insufficient solution. Part IV provides the justification for the “patent fair use 2.0”
proposal, sets it out in some detail, and then illustrates how it might be applied to
the cases of open source software and essential medicines. Part V concludes.
II. WHY PATENT FAIR USE NOW?
A. Professor O’Rourke’s Patent Fair Use Proposal
This Article is certainly not the first to recognize many of these justifications
for infringement exemptions. In particular, a groundbreaking article by Maureen
O’Rourke over ten years ago proposed a version of “patent fair use” based on
many of the considerations that will be discussed here.91 Reasoning by analogy to
fair use in copyright law and expanding on existing patent doctrines, O’Rourke
identified a list of five factors, which she argued should form the basis of a patent
fair use doctrine: “i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; ii)
the purpose of the infringing use; iii) the nature and strength of the market failure
that prevents a license from being concluded; iv) the impact of the use on the
patentee’s incentives and overall social welfare; and v) the nature of the patented
work.”92
O’Rourke’s explication of these factors focused on the potential for market
failure in the patent system and on the implications of a fair use finding for
patentee incentives to invent. Thus, for instance, she notes that “commercial use is
much more likely to harm the patentee’s incentives without a corresponding
increase in social welfare,”93 points to the statutory exemption for use of patented
inventions to prepare for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval as an
example of a situation in which the social value of certain types of infringement
has been deemed to outweigh any corresponding depression of incentives,94 and
discusses a number of situations in which fair use could be used to ensure that
patentees do not have overly broad ability to hamper follow-on innovation. For
example, her first factor is included for reasons similar to those justifying the
reverse doctrine of equivalents—to protect radical improvers from holdup by
earlier patentees.95
O’Rourke focuses heavily on the need for fair use in circumstances in which
network effects give patentees overly broad control over markets extending
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

O’Rourke, supra note 7.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1197–98.
Id. at 1228–30.
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beyond the market for the patented invention itself,96 discussing the case of
software application programming interfaces (APIs) in detail.97 She recognizes the
potential for licensing breakdown in situations involving complex products that
implicate many patents (the “anticommons” problem) and the related possibility
that licensing breakdown might undermine the “blocking patents” doctrine.98 The
blocking patents doctrine assumes that those who improve significantly upon
patented inventions will be able to coordinate exploitation of the improvement
with the initial patentee because both parties will be motivated to cross-license.99
Importantly, O’Rourke suggests that a fee should sometimes be charged for
patent “fair use.”100 In this respect her proposal foreshadows the practices of
those district courts that have ordered ongoing royalties while denying injunctions
in the wake of eBay.101
B. Signs of the Times: O’Rourke’s Concerns Remain Valid Today
Most of the arguments O’Rourke made in her 2000 article remain compelling
today. Indeed, in many respects, O’Rourke’s article was ahead of its time. Many of
the justifications she advanced for some form of patent fair use have become
considerably stronger in recent years. While the anticommons problem was
recognized at the turn of this century, the particular issues raised by nonpracticing
entities (so-called “patent trolls”) in relation to complex technology were not yet
widely recognized.102 By 2006, however, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay v.
MercExchange responded explicitly to concerns about nonpracticing entities and the
problem of holdup for complex technologies.103 Similarly, while the research
exemption was a topic of concern in 2000, the Federal Circuit’s 2002 Madey v.
Duke opinion heightened concerns about the diminishing scope of the common
law exemption.104 The issue of unauthorized research tool use remains much

96. Id. at 1233–34.
97. Id. at 1211–35.
98. Id. at 1236–39. See also Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
99. O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1194.
100. Id. at 1234–35.
101. See discussion, supra.
102. The first use of the term “patent troll” in a law review article, for example, was in 2003.
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 509 (2003).
103. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (“An industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (experimental use
defense persists in a “very narrow form”). Though, the Supreme Court did preserve a broad reading
of the statutory FDA exemption. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
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discussed and unresolved.105 Longstanding concerns about the applicability of
patent infringement doctrine to reverse engineering of software, a central focus of
O’Rourke’s analysis, also remain.106
C. Signs of the Times: Evolving Reasons for Patent Fair Use
Not only have developments over the past ten years heightened some of the
concerns motivating O’Rourke’s fair use proposal, but also new issues have come
to the fore that both provide additional rationales for a fair-use-type infringement
exemption and help us to flesh out factors relevant to such an exemption.
Traditionally, one could divide the world of potential patent infringers into
several categories: commercial users of industrial processes, commercial
manufacturers of patented products, innovators building upon patented products
or processes, and consumers of patented products. Commercial users of industrial
processes and manufacturers of patented products could be expected to negotiate
patent licenses. Follow-on innovators were protected by a complex of patent
doctrines: the reverse doctrine of equivalents (or its predecessors) in principle
protected radical innovators from holdup by earlier inventors; the experimental
use exemption permitted inventors to build upon the patent disclosures of earlier
inventors; and the doctrine of blocking patents, which allows the patenting of
improvements without the permission of earlier inventors (in contrast to the
situation in copyright law),107 encouraged inventors of complementary inventions
to negotiate cross-licenses. In a world dominated by manufacturer innovation,
there was little need to worry about infringement by what we would now call end
users of technology. Consumers of patented products were protected by the
doctrine of patent exhaustion (which holds that a patentee’s rights in a particular
artifact are “exhausted” when the artifact is sold to a consumer by an authorized
manufacturer).108
Recent changes in law and technology have changed the landscape.
Traditional approaches may no longer suffice to induce the optimal level of
invention, disclosure, and dissemination of new technology. Here I discuss five
important developments that provide reasons for concern about the balance
among patent exclusivity, access, and follow-on innovation: i) the increasing

105. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7 (explicitly leaving open the status of research tools
under the statutory research exemption); Proveris Sci. Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (device used in development of FDA submissions, but not itself subject to FDA
approval, was not covered by statutory research exemption). See also Strandburg, Users as Innovators,
supra note 29, at 502–03.
106. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009).
107. See Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2001).
108. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2117 (2008). See also 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
16.03[2][a] (2010).
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importance (and recognition of) nontraditional paradigms of innovation, including
open source approaches and user innovation, especially within communities of
users; ii) a breakdown of the effectiveness of patent exhaustion and repair and
reconstruction as a means to take consumers out of the patent infringement loop;
iii) growing evidence of the ineffectiveness of patent notice and search, especially
in some technological arenas; iv) increasing recognition of the prevalence of
independent invention among potential infringers; and v) the increasing ubiquity
of software in technology, which is accompanied by a growing separation of
design from manufacture and a movement toward mass customization. Each of
these developments upsets assumptions underlying the traditional patent regime,
changing the balance of costs and benefits of patenting in ways that may justify
broader infringement exemptions.
1. Alternative Paradigms of Innovation
Numerous patent doctrines reflect an assumption of an industrial seller
innovator. Yet, as others and I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, that
paradigm is increasingly out of date.109 The success of the open source software
movement, with its increasingly important role in commercial ventures, is itself a
game changer.110 Moreover, that success has spawned a number of attempts to
introduce similar collaborative models into other arenas, including
biotechnology,111 agriculture,112 and traditional tangible products.113 Alongside the
growing importance of this particular model of collaborative innovation is
increasing recognition of the importance of users as technology innovators and of
the extent to which groups of users of similar technology often share their
inventions freely with one another, even in commercial contexts.114 Technological

109.

See, e.g., Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 29; BENKLER, supra note 29; see ERIC

VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
110. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN

SOURCE (2004); Siobhán O’Mahony &
Beth Bechky, Boundary Organizations: Enabling Collaboration Among Unexpected Allies, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
422 (2008).
111. For a recent review of these efforts, see Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A
Path to More Accessible Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 217 (2010). See also
Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms, supra note 29.
112. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, “Free Seeds, Not Free Beer”: Participatory Plant Breeding, Open Source Seeds,
and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (2009).
113. For an interesting example of such a project see QUIRKY INC., http://www.quirky.com
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011). Of course, community innovation of tangible products is not at all new.
See, e.g., Nikolas Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An Exploration of
Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL’Y 157 (2003) (studying community innovation
among users of sports equipment).
114. VON HIPPEL, supra note 109; Dietmar Harhoff et al., Profiting from Voluntary Information
Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations, 32 RES. POL’Y 1752 (2003); Joachim
Henkel, Selective Revealing in Open Innovation Processes: The Case of Embedded Linux, 35 RES. POL’Y 953
(2006); Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Free Revealing and the Private Collective Model for Innovation
Incentives, 36 R&D MGMT. 295 (2006).
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shifts, especially the increasing importance of software as a component of
technology and of computers as means for facilitating collaboration, suggest that
the contribution of these nontraditional paradigms is likely to grow.115
Where user, open, or collaborative innovation predominates, a number of
basic assumptions of patent doctrine are undercut.116 Incentives to invent,
disclose, and disseminate technology may be provided by use, by reciprocal
exchange, or by other nonpatent mechanisms, decreasing the importance of patent
incentives and correspondingly tilting the cost-benefit balance away from
exclusivity. Such approaches sometime target markets underserved by or outside
of the scope of the markets that are important to the patentee, thus decreasing the
impact of infringement on the patentee’s profits and increasing the potential
positive social externalities of unauthorized use. Moreover, user, open, and
collaborative innovations are often either unpatentable because of issues of
inventorship due to their incremental and emergent origins or unpatented because
their inventors do not wish to patent them or lack the funds to do so. Because
these innovations are not patent protected, the blocking patent doctrine—patent
law’s mechanism for balancing rights between initial and follow-on inventors—
breaks down.117
2. The Declining Relevance of Patent Exhaustion and the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction
Under the traditional seller innovator paradigm, the doctrines of patent
exhaustion (corresponding to copyright’s “first sale” doctrine)118 and
repair/reconstruction119 provided significant protection for consumers against
liability for patent infringement while making ordinary use and repair of their
purchases. The protection provided by these doctrines is shrinking, however.
First, the position of users of patented products and processes has shifted
drastically due to the increasing dominance of software and business method
claims. More and more often, ordinary consumers find themselves in the position,
not of purchasers of products over which patent rights have been exhausted, but
of users of patented processes or “systems” to which patent exhaustion may not
apply.120 For example, ordinary consumers use most software products as
115. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 29; Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm
Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, (HARV. BUS. SCH. Working Paper
No 10-038, 2009), available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6325.html.
116. Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 29.
117. Ex ante licensing approaches, such as the General Public License (GPL) often used in
open source software, are of only limited use in the patent context, since infringers need not be
copiers and thus need have no pre-existing relationship with a patentee in order to infringe. For an
extensive recent discussion of the GPL, see Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open Source Software:
Knowledge Production, Hybrid Appropriability, and Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2009).
118. 17 U.S.C. §109 (2006).
119. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, §16.03[3] (2010).
120. The Supreme Court held in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S.
617, 638 (2008), that method patents may be exhausted by the sale of an item that “substantially
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licensees. These licenses may contain both copyright- and patent-based
limitations. While in most situations to date commercial entities mediate
consumers’ access to patented technology and provide any necessary licenses,
those same licenses often purport to restrict significantly what purchasers can do
with the technology.121 While the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc. reaffirmed the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the Court specifically
declined to address what limits (if any) apply to adhesion contract restrictions on
consumer use.122 Lower courts have generally enforced such restrictions.123
Moreover, patents are increasingly likely to cover things that users and small
entrepreneurs can do and make for themselves, without a manufacturer or other
commercial intermediary.124 These types of actors generally have neither the
sophistication nor the funds to engage in patent clearance searches (indeed, many
have argued that even sophisticated players cannot effectively clear patent rights in
the software and business method arenas125). Nor do they have the wherewithal to
engage effectively in case-by-case licensing transactions even if they do learn of a
potentially relevant patent.
Similarly, in the past, the repair/reconstruction doctrine generally protected
consumers when they engaged in intuitively reasonable manipulations of their
patented purchases. Thus, in the “old” days, consumers found it unreasonable to
be precluded from repairing things they had purchased, even if those items were
patented. Patent doctrine recognized this expectation as legitimate.126
Reconstruction of patented inventions, however, was much more likely to be the

embodies” the method. The scope of situations in which exhaustion applies to methods is not at all
clear, however. The district court in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 712 F. Supp.
2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010) aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 2009-1450, 2011 WL 607381 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 18, 2011), determined that exhaustion applied to sale of a service, for example, but the question
was one of first impression and similar questions have not yet been addressed by other courts.
121. There are reasons to be concerned about the permissible scope and terms of these
licenses. Others have discussed this issue, primarily in the context of software copyright licenses. See,
e.g., Molly Shaffer van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008); R. Anthony Reese, The
First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577 (2003); Glen O. Robinson, Personal
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004); Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can
License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 (2006);
Saami Zain, Quanta Leap or Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis of the Effects of Quanta vs. LG
Electronics, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 67 (2010). I do not discuss it here.
122. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 637 n.7; see also McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 545 U.S. 1139 (2005),
denying certiorari in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which enforced a
contractual restriction on use of second generation patented seeds.
123. See discussion of the case law in Zain, supra note 121.
124. This is the case for business method and software patents and increasingly may be the
case for tangible goods as technology for “mass customization” through “toolkits” and for “3D
printing” improves. See, e.g., Simon Bradshaw et al., The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D
Printing, 7 SCRIPTED 5 (2010) (discussing the issue in the context of UK law); Eric von Hippel,
Perspective: User Toolkits for Innovation, 18 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT., 247 (2001).
125. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1.
126. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §16.03[3] (2010).
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province of commercial players.127 The repair/reconstruction doctrine evolved to
separate these two types of behavior, broadly privileging repair, even when it
involved using aftermarket parts, while counting wholesale reconstruction of
patented products as infringement (and thus protecting patentees from attempts
by competitors to undermine patent exclusivity through the sale of “parts”).128
Nowadays, in contrast, consumers are increasingly “prosumers,” who expect to
interact with the products they purchase in creative and innovative ways.129 The
applicability of the repair/reconstruction distinction either to the increasing
number of products that are licensed rather than purchased or to significant
consumer customization is unclear at best.
3. Breakdown of Patent Notice and Search
Much has been written lately about the breakdown of the patent notice
function in certain technological areas. As discussed in detail by Bessen and
Meurer, this breakdown is due in part to inherent difficulties in describing
software and business method inventions, in part to low standards for enablement
and description in these areas, which permit broad and vaguely bounded claims,
and in part to the unpredictability of claim construction, which can lead to patent
coverage of inventions that were completely unforeseeable at the time of
patenting.130 The import of these problems is to increase the cost of patent search
and decrease its effectiveness (to the point where, in software for instance, even
sophisticated commercial players reportedly often opt out of patent clearance and
hope for the best131).
Patent search problems will be even greater for those engaged in the new
innovation paradigms. Consumer innovators lack the sophistication and funds to
embark on searches. Moreover, emergent innovations such as open source
software lack a central “blueprint” that even could be compared with patent

127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, supra note 61. Copying in Patent Law,
87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
129. The term “prosumer” has taken on a variety of meanings. Here I adopt the meaning
originated by Alvin Toffler, who coined the term in 1980, ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE
(1980), and discussed in a recent book Toffler co-authored with his wife, ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI
TOFFLER, REVOLUTIONARY WEALTH (2006) (defining prosumer as “[o]ne who creates goods,
services or experiences for his own satisfaction, rather than for sale or exchange”). The Tofflers’
predictions of “revolutionary wealth” are sadly pre-2008, but their predictions of a rise in
“presumption” are reflected in widespread Web 2.0 phenomena and perhaps in an incipient wave of
mass customization of tangible goods. See also, e.g., Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome If They Don’t
Screw It Up: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight over the Next Great Disruptive Technology, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE WHITE PAPER, Nov. 2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/it-will-be-awesome-ifthey-dont-screw-it-up (describing the emerging technology of 3D printing and its potential to
empower users to customize and create products).
130. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18.
131. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note 61.
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claims.132
4. The Importance of Independent Invention
Though copying has never been a requirement of patent infringement (as it
is for copyright infringement), much of traditional patent doctrine and rhetoric
assumes implicitly that infringers are generally copyists.133 While independent,
nearly simultaneous invention has undoubtedly always been common, the extent
to which infringement suits involve independent inventors as defendants is newly
recognized and probably increasing as a result of the patent notice problems
described in the previous section. Empirical studies at least suggest that a large
fraction of accused infringers, if not most, are independent inventors (or at least
are not copyists).134
Independent invention (at least if it is close to, even if after, the time of
patenting) diminishes the force of the free rider justification for patenting,
suggesting that the patent incentive may not have been needed to induce a given
invention.135 Even if we need the prospect of a patent to induce a race to produce
a particular innovation, economic arguments suggest that there is no need for a
winner-take-all regime.136
Moreover, fairness concerns weigh against imposing infringement liability on
independent inventors; those concerns are enhanced when the preferred
alternative—patent search—is expensive or infeasible. For all of these reasons,
commentators have increasingly suggested either an independent inventor defense
or other means to decrease the burden of patent liability for independent
inventors.137

132. While most open source software projects seem to have some kind of hierarchical
structure for vetting “official” versions. See Weber, supra note 110. It seems unlikely, at least for a
complex piece of software such as an operating system, that even the vetters have a complete view of
the detailed implementation of algorithms in the various modules and all of their interactions.
Moreover, one of the values of open source software is its customizability by users. Customizers are
even less likely to be able to perform a proper patent clearing search.
133. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 727
(2002); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (explaining the
doctrine of equivalents as a defense against “unscrupulous copyists”).
134. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley, supra note 61, at 1440‒49.
135. For this reason, nearly simultaneous invention is sometimes treated as a “secondary
consideration” suggesting obviousness. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05[7]
(2010).
136. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent-Invention Defense in
Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and
Contribution, in 7 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, 111 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2007);
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
137. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1525 (2007); Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Intellectual Property, 98 GEO. L.J.
1643 (2010); Shapiro, supra note 136; Vermont, supra note 136; Samson Vermont, The Angel Is in the Big
Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1537 (2007).
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One justification for nonetheless deeming independent inventors to be
infringers relies on the idea that duplicative research is wasteful, a justification
which is at least controversial.138 Moreover, this justification makes sense only if
the patent notice function is effective so that search costs are not too high. This
does not seem to be the case in many arenas, as just discussed.
Another justification for holding independent inventors liable for
infringement applies to those who keep their inventions as trade secrets. Potential
infringement liability may induce some inventors to opt for patenting rather than
trade secrecy.139 It is not at all clear that trade secrecy is worse for society than
patenting in situations where independent invention occurs, however.
Independent inventors operating in secret are still presumably in competition with
one another (at least if they are commercial inventors), so the public gets the
benefit of lower prices, even if disclosure is delayed. Moreover, only one of these
inventors need make the choice to freely reveal the invention to undermine the
secrecy of the others. In any event, prior user defenses, which excuse infringement
by independent inventors who do not make it to the patent office first, are
common in other patent systems.140 The United States has had a limited prior user
defense in the business method patent arena141 for more than ten years without
apparent ill effect. Indeed, the America Invents Act has make such a defense
available generally to prior commercial users, if their use began more than one
year before the application for the allegedly infringed patent was filed.142
5. Mass Customization and the Separation Between Manufacture and Design
Much has been made in the copyright literature about the changing structure
of the entertainment industry, from a system of centralized production aimed at
mass markets to an increasingly decentralized and individualized marketplace, in
which users play important roles in disseminating and creating content.143 Similar
138. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 870–79 (1990).
139. This theory is reflected in patent case law, which treats an inventor’s own trade secret
exploitation of an invention as “public use” but allows patenting in the face of a third party’s secret
use. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Early
public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system. As between a prior inventor who benefits from a
process by selling its product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the
public, and a later inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public will gain a
disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.”). Though the America Invents Act, Sec. 3,
changes the prior art definitions in a number of ways, it retains the term “public use,” which policy
arguments suggest should continue to be interpreted in this way.
140. See Christopher Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, INT’L CENTRE
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., Issue Paper No. 17 (Oct. 2006) at 5–6, 49–50 (discussing prior
user rights in various countries).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (1999).
142. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
143. Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2009); Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster
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changes in the production of goods are under discussion in the management
literature, but have been little noted in the legal literature.144
Just as computer technology and the Internet have lessened (or even
undermined) the need for identical mass-produced entertainment products, the
increasing role of computerized design, manufacture, and operation with respect
to tangible goods makes it easier to customize products and to design user-friendly
“toolkits” for customization.145 The line between user and manufacturer is
beginning to blur. Moreover, some experts predict an increasing availability of
custom fabrication plants and even of home equipment for “3D printing,” which
will even more significantly blur the distinction between user and manufacturer
and between designing and producing tangible goods.146 If these predictions are
realized, not only will consumers be more able to design their own products, but
also there will likely be a growing number of “designer innovator” entrepreneurs
who, rather than contracting with a manufacturer to produce products using their
designs, will seek to market designs directly to consumers. Patents may or may not
play an important role in such new business models.147 In this brave new world,
ordinary consumers may be able to make more extensive modifications of
patented technology than was possible with earlier tangible goods. They may also
be more likely to stumble upon patented technology through independent
invention, to be able to make copies of patented technology for their own use, and
to be “innocent purchasers” of infringing technology made by others. All of these
developments taken together mean that it will become more and more likely that
small entities (consumers or “designer innovators”), for whom the transaction
costs involved in clearing patent rights would be prohibitive, will be patent
Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
577 (2008); Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for User-Generated
Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921 (2009); Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan
Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2009); Steven Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai
Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963 (2009); Mary W.S. Wong,
“Transformative” User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 (2009).
144. See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION, supra note 109.
145. See, e.g., Nikolas Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for User Innovation and
Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 401(2004); Nikolas Franke &
Eric A. von Hippel, Satisfying Heterogeneous User Needs via Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security
Software, 32 RES. POL’Y 1199 (2003); Eric A. von Hippel & Ralph Katz, Shifting Innovation to Users via
Toolkits, 48 MGMT. SCI. 821 (2002); Lars Bo Jeppesen, User Toolkits for Innovation: Consumers Support
Each Other, 22 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 347 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Simon Bradshaw et al., The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 7
SCRIPTED 5 (2010) (discussing the issue in the context of UK law); Eric von Hippel, Perspective: User
Toolkits for Innovation, 18 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 247 (2001); see also PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
WHITE PAPER, supra note 129, at 2 (“The machines can download plans for a wrench from the
Internet and print out a real, working wrench. Users design their own jewelry, gears, brackets, and
toys with a computer program, and use their machines to create real jewelry, gears, brackets, and
toys.”).
147. This issue is worthy of more extensive consideration, which I do not attempt here.

Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

11/7/2011 10:16 AM

PATENT FAIR USE 2.0

289

infringers not protected by patent exhaustion or the repair/reconstruction
doctrine.
III. EXISTING EX POST DOCTRINES AND RECENT PROPOSALS
While there is no general defense to patent infringement analogous to
copyright’s fair use doctrine, there are, as already discussed in passing, various ex
post doctrines in patent law that seek to address the issues of transaction failures,
the balance between initial and follow-on innovators, and the potential that
overriding societal costs may outweigh the benefits of patenting. These doctrines
are inadequate to the task of serving as effective policy levers for various reasons.
As discussed above, some, such as the experimental use exemption148 and prior
user defense for business methods,149 are too narrowly targeted or interpreted to
serve the purpose. The expanded prior user defense in the America Invents Act
remains ill-suited for ex post tailoring infringement liability to socially relevant
context at the time of infringement. It applies across the board to all types of
commercial use (and some noncommercial uses), regardless of context, but only
reaches uses that began more than one year before the asserted patent was filed.
Other doctrines, such as the reverse doctrine of equivalents150 and patent
misuse,151 are never or increasingly rarely applied. Still others, such as the
doctrines of patent exhaustion and repair/reconstruction, are no longer adequate
in light of social and technical changes. The most recent addition to the list—the
discretion given to district court judges as a result of the Supreme Court’s eBay v.
MercExchange decision—is promising but at least to date inadequately tailored to
the innovation issues motivating the patent system.
In light of the slim ex post options available under existing law,
commentators have made a number of suggestions for reform. These suggestions
fall primarily into two categories: proposals to beef up existing doctrines and
proposals to deal with independent invention.
A. Proposals to Beef Up Existing Doctrines
A number of scholars (including this one) have argued for a more expansive
research exemption, while others have disputed the wisdom of such an
exemption.152 The Supreme Court has in fact taken an expansive approach to the
statutory exemption for experimentation related to FDA approval.153 While I

148. See also supra note 70; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1.
149. See also id.
150. See also id.
151. See also id.
152. For reviews of the literature see Sarnoff & Holman, supra note 78; Strandburg, supra note
6 (relating to both common law and statutory exemptions).
153. See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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continue to believe an expansive research exemption is a good idea, there are
limits to what a piecemeal approach can accomplish (particularly if implemented
by statute).
For example, I have argued elsewhere that a business method use exemption
would be justified by arguments based on user innovation very similar to those I
offered for expanding the research exemption.154 Despite the similar justifications,
these proposals raise entirely separate questions under existing law. Similarly, the
statutory exemption from imposition of remedies (but not from infringement
liability) for a medical practitioner’s “performance of a medical or surgical
procedure on a body”155 is ill equipped to deal with issues raised by the
outsourcing of diagnostic testing to independent laboratories, despite the fact that
similar questions about doctors as user innovators and the importance of
noncommercial motivations arise.156 If we can identify common factors underlying
various scenarios in which an infringement exemption would be desirable it is
sensible to consider the merits of a more general fair-use-like doctrine.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is, of course, a general approach and
several authors (including Burk and Lemley in the book that is the impetus for this
symposium) have suggested revitalizing it.157 The doctrine, which the Federal
Circuit recently described as “rarely invoked and virtually never sustained,”158
might in principle have the potential to play a role similar to the role that
“transformative use” plays in copyright’s fair use doctrine.159 It could be employed
to deal with “blocking patent failure,” in which bargaining between initial and
follow-on inventors with overlapping patent rights breaks down or there is
independent invention of a significant advance over a patented technology.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is unlikely to rise to the occasion,
however. The doctrine applies, according to the Supreme Court, “where a device
is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or
similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the

154. Strandburg, supra note 83.
155. 35 USC § 287(c) (1999).
156. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (writ
of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted in case involving patentability of broad claims to
medical diagnostic tests); Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding broad claims to medical diagnostic tests patentable) cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
157. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1; Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent
Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 12–15 (2009); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 Duke L. J. 1, 118‒19 (2004); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1010–13 (1997); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 138, at 856‒66.
158. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
159. See Samuelson, supra note 4.
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literal words of the claim.”160 Simply reading this description within the context of
modern patent law is enough to explain why the defense is never successful. It has
the ring of a remnant of a historical central claiming regime in which it made sense
to invoke the “principle” of an invention.161 In its current form it makes little
sense in a peripheral claiming regime. Moreover, the doctrine is described in terms
that are unmoored from any innovation policy goal and will certainly seem
obscure to any jury tasked with applying it (the “unreversed” doctrine of
equivalents is bad enough in that respect).162
Finally, depending on how an expanded reverse doctrine of equivalents was
defined, even a beefed up form of this defense could be substantially under- and
overinclusive: Why apply it only when the accused infringing product or process
“performs the same or similar function” or when there is a “fundamental change
in the basic principle by which the device operates”?163 And do we really want to
exempt infringement even in cases in which the infringer copied and there was no
reason to expect bargaining breakdown? Suppose, for example, that the initial
patentee offers a standard nonexclusive license to all comers. These cases may
warrant exemption if the new invention is a big enough advance, but in its present
form, the reverse doctrine of equivalents does not account for these factors at all.
In sum, while the impetus to revive the reverse doctrine of equivalents is a
sound one, accounting for the size of an improvement in a multi-factored fair-usetype test is likely both to reflect the underlying policy goals more accurately and to
be more palatable to decision makers. Similar problems arise when considering the
potential for patent misuse to play an important role as an ex post policy lever, as
Burk and Lemley acknowledge.164
B. Proposals to Deal with Independent Invention
A number of legal commentators have proposed exempting independent
inventors from infringement liability.165 As discussed above, there are several
policy reasons to favor such a proposal, given the importance of independent
invention and the growing difficulty, at least in some technological arenas, of
performing cost-effective patent clearances.
In a response to a thoughtful analysis and proposal by Samson Vermont,166
however, Mark Lemley has argued that an independent inventor defense might be
very strong medicine indeed, given the historical prevalence of nearly
160. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950)
(emphasis added).
161. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 1773–74 (describing how the reverse doctrine of
equivalents originated in a central claiming regime).
162. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, supra note 23, at 1141, n.23 (making a similar point).
163. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1338.
164. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1.
165. See, e.g., references supra note 136.
166. Vermont, supra note 136.
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simultaneous invention.167 Though this is not necessarily reason not to enact such
a defense (if the defense is warranted, the prevalence of independent invention
also suggests a very large social payoff from enacting it), it does give one pause.
Moreover, as Lemley also argues, there may be special concerns about an
independent inventor defense in particular arenas (Lemley mentions
pharmaceuticals) involving high costs and high expected payoffs.168 Lemley
suggests four approaches, short of an independent invention defense, to address
some of the problems posed by infringement liability for independent inventors:
(i) requiring copying as an element of willful infringement; (ii) expanding prior
user rights beyond business methods (as Congress recently did); (iii) using nearly
simultaneous invention as a secondary indication of obviousness; and (iv) taking
account of independent invention in evaluating whether to award injunctive
relief.169
These are all sensible suggestions for stopping short of a bright line
independent inventor defense. Incorporating the questions of copying and
independent invention into a fair-use-like exemption from infringement liability
similarly would add flexibility and be less drastic than an across-the-board
independent invention defense (and, if fair use can be accompanied by an
obligation to pay royalties, might be very similar indeed to the suggestion
regarding injunctive relief). A fair-use-type exemption has at least two types of
advantages over Lemley’s proposals.
First, rather than simply scaling back liability when there is independent
invention, it permits courts to tailor the exemption in light of the technology
involved and other relevant factors. Second, and I think importantly, a fair-usetype defense could handle a point that is not much discussed in the independent
invention analyses. The world of potential infringers is not simply divided into
copyists and independent inventors. There are degrees of copying and
independent invention. There are those who copy from an unmarked (but
patented) product and those who copy slavishly from the patent itself. There are
those who are “inspired” by the patent, but produce radical improvements. There
are independent inventors who willfully turn their eyes away from clearly relevant
patent literature and those who would have to make large investments to
determine whether they are infringing another’s patent. Further, there is a whole
gray area of other potential infringers: those who copy from an independent
167. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1528.
168. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1529. He also argues that an independent inventor defense
might make it more difficult to have a workable market for patent rights. Id. at 1531–32. This
argument applies to virtually any ex post policy lever. However, like Vermont in his reply to Lemley’s
critique, supra note 137, at 1539–40, I think this argument is not particularly strong, given the many
degrees of uncertainty already plaguing the definition of patent rights. Moreover, if the copyright
context is at all analogous, it gives cause for hope since the market for copyrighted works seems to
have survived the ex ante uncertainties of the fair use defense.
169. Lemley, supra note 137, at 1532–35.
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inventor, those who copy from a copyist, and so forth. Taking copying and
independent invention into account as factors in a fair-use-type analysis permits a
more nuanced (and less difficult to implement) response to these various factual
scenarios, providing policy levers that can take into account differences between
technologies and other contextual factors.
IV. PATENT FAIR USE 2.0: A PROPOSAL
Given the reasons to favor a fair-use-like patent infringement exemption,
what should it look like? As with copyright’s fair use, there is a tension between
providing flexibility and giving patentees, potential fair users, and courts sufficient
clarity of implementation. While O’Rourke’s proposal is an excellent jumping-off
point, I have argued elsewhere that it may be quite difficult for courts to
implement.170 In particular, factors (iii) (“the nature and strength of the market
failure that prevents a license from being concluded”) and (iv) (“the impact of the
use on the patentee’s incentives and overall social welfare”)171 are little more than
directions to grant fair use where it would be socially desirable to do so.
Necessarily, O’Rourke’s proposal also fails to incorporate factors whose relevance
has only become apparent during the past ten years. Can we do better? Though it
is an inherently difficult task, I think so. In particular, developments over the past
ten years may allow us to be more specific about some of the factors that should
be considered.
To come up with a list of relevant factors, it is helpful to back up and
categorize the circumstances under which exemption from infringement may be
appropriate. Because of the strength of the arguments for exempting independent
inventors from liability, I begin by dividing the analysis between factors that
should be relevant whether or not the infringer has copied from the patentee and
factors that are relevant only when there is no copying. This is also a useful
division because the analogy to copyright fair use is most relevant in situations
involving copying. Since independent inventors (and others who have not copied
from the patentee) have a stronger case for exemption than copyists do, any
factors that might weigh in favor of exempting a copyist should weigh in favor of
exempting an independent inventor as well. The next section discusses such
factors. After considering factors that would be relevant even when there has been
copying, I turn to consider factors that will be relevant only when an alleged
infringer has not copied from the patentee.
A. Fair Use Even for Knowing Copyists
There are three types of analytically distinct (though possibly overlapping)
situations in which an infringement exemption might be socially desirable even
170.
171.

See Strandburg, supra note 79.
O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1206–07.
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when an infringer has copied from the patentee. First, there are situations
involving excusable licensing failure. Second, there are situations involving large
improvements (analogous to “transformative uses” in copyright fair use). Third,
there are situations in which patent incentives are not needed (or, more precisely,
where the boost to invention resulting from patent incentives is not worth the
trade-off in exclusivity). Each type of situation suggests factors to consider in a
fair-use-type approach.
1. Excusable Licensing Failures
The category of excusable licensing failures has a large overlap with the types
of concerns motivating at least some understandings of copyright fair use.172
Three sub-categories are useful in the analysis: underserved markets, what
O’Rourke calls “anti-patent” refusals to license,173 and “anticommons”-type
holdups in relation to complex products or processes.174
a. Underserved Markets
Under-served markets can arise either because potential users are unable to
pay the patented price or because the transaction costs of licensing exceed the
value of use. The most noted example of underserved markets in patent law
involves patented pharmaceuticals.175 It is evident that there are large numbers of
individuals in developing countries who would benefit from lifesaving drugs yet
are unable to pay the going rate. Arguably, generic companies could manufacture
and sell inexpensive drugs to these underserved markets without undercutting the
pharmaceutical companies’ profits from patented medicines in developed
countries. In considering whether a fair use exemption should apply, courts should
look for situations involving high social value and low ability to pay. In some cases
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial use is a reasonable proxy
for ability to pay (and would weigh in favor of exempting educational and
nonprofit research uses, for example).
The pharmaceutical example points up a dilemma often posed by the
possibility of fair-use-type exemptions for underserved markets, however. While
the social value of providing lifesaving medicines to those who cannot afford
them is extremely high, the potential for arbitrage—leakage of cheap goods back
into the market for those who can pay—weighs against the benefit of providing

172. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601–02 (1982).
173. O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1199.
174. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 24.
175. See, e.g., Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low- and MiddleIncome Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159 (2006); Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the
TRIPS Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 107 (2008).
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lower-priced drugs only to those who cannot afford the going rate.176 If such gray
market goods undermine drug inventors’ ability to recoup their investment, future
innovation might be in danger. This possibility clearly must play a role in weighing
whether to allow an exemption for the purpose of serving those who lack ability
to pay.
In the pharmaceutical example, a generic manufacturer is needed to give
those in developing countries access to the patented technology. In this respect it
differs from the personal use paradigm, which commonly dominates thinking
about fair use as a response to underserved markets in copyright.177 For personal
use, the concern is less about ability to pay than about prohibitive transaction
costs associated with licensing. Increasingly, as discussed above, consumers have
the potential to infringe patents directly, without the mediation of a manufacturer.
In situations where there is no easy way to purchase an embodiment or a standard
license to a patented invention, transaction costs may make licensing ineffective.
Such situations weigh in favor of a fair use exemption. Exempting personal use
would even be in line with the Federal Circuit’s recent narrow reading of the
experimental use exemption as extending to uses “for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”178 and could be quite effective in
protecting user innovators whose customizations might stray beyond “repair” and
into “reconstruction.”
Factors to consider in determining whether an exemption should be made
for an underserved market should thus include whether the use was commercial or
noncommercial, the likely danger to the patentee’s markets due to arbitrage, and
the availability of low-transaction-cost means to obtain embodiments of or
licenses to the patented technology that would obviate the need for unauthorized
activity.
b. “Anti-Patent” Refusals to License
In the copyright context, fair use is often employed to facilitate criticism,
parody, and other uses of copyrighted material to which a copyright owner objects
not out of a desire to control the market for the patented invention but out of a
desire to suppress a socially desirable activity that might undermine (rather than
compete in) the patentee’s market.179 These fair uses often implicate First
176. See, e.g., Michael Ilg, Market Competition in Aid of Humanitarian Concern: Reconsidering
Pharmaceutical Drug Patents, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 149 (2010); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive
Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917 (2009).
177. A similar concern does arise with respect to potential fair use of copyrighted textbooks in
developing countries. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007).
178. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Embrex, Inc. v.
Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
179. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 172; O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1207; Samuelson, supra note
4.
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Amendment concerns, which generally are not salient in the patent context.180
Nonetheless, similar concerns underlie arguments for a research exemption
applied to “experimenting on” a patented invention to understand, design around,
or improve upon it.181 O’Rourke also identifies refusals to permit reverse
engineering to develop compatible products as similarly intended to subvert the
limitations of the patent right by extending a patentee’s control to markets for
complementary goods.182 Refusals to license substantial improvements as a means
to hold up the improver for higher royalties also fit into a category of “antipatent” refusals to license.
c. Holdup Due to “Anticommons”-Type Issues
As O’Rourke and many others have pointed out, patent licensing may fail
because of “anticommons” issues, in which negotiations over licensing are
complicated by a need to assemble large numbers of licenses to produce a
particular product or implement a particular process.183 At the time of O’Rourke’s
writing, concern about the anticommons problem focused on biotechnology and
gene patenting.184 In the past ten years, however, it has become evident that major
anticommons issues arise in the information technology arena.185 While these
issues can sometimes be resolved by forming patent pools (in which a number of
industry players are granted cross-licenses to one another’s patented
technology),186 patent pools are actually rather rare.187 Moreover, these problems
are exacerbated where, as is often the case in the information technology sector,
some patents are held by nonpracticing entities that have no interest in crosslicensing.188
At least some Supreme Court justices recognized this issue when deciding
the eBay case, discussed above.189 While the factors set out in eBay to guide courts’
discretion in awarding injunctive relief are not tailored to innovation concerns,
180. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 4, at 2546–68.
181. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 79; Strandburg, supra note 73.
182. O’Rourke, supra note 7 at 1227–30.
183. Id. at 1179–80. See also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 24; Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
184. Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 24.
185. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 183; Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The
Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1756-57 (2007).
186. See, e.g., Ed Levy et al., Patent Pools and Genomics: Navigating a Course to Open Science?, 16
B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75 (2010); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 118, 120 (Adam Jaffe, Josh
Lerner, & Scott Stern eds., 2001).
187. For a recent survey of patent pools, see David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates
Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KNOWLEDGE, ECOLOGY, INT’L (June 4, 2007),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf. See also Merges, supra note 18, at 1355.
188. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 183, at 2015.
189. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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courts have in fact employed them to deny injunctions and impose ongoing
royalties primarily in cases involving nonpracticing entities, as discussed by Burk
and Lemley.190
Though eBay v. MercExchange has alleviated concerns about holdup from
“patent trolls,” the danger that courts may not have their eyes on innovation
policy and may simply turn the “injunction always” rule into a “no injunctions for
nonpracticing entities” rule remains. Thus, for example, whether the infringer is a
copyist or an independent inventor and the extent of the inventive contributions
of patentee and infringer arguably should play a role in determining whether
injunctive relief is warranted and whether a royalty should be imposed in a
potential anticommons scenario. An independent inventor will be particularly
subject to holdup if he or she has made a substantial investment in producing a
complex product incorporating a patented invention. Such an inventor may have
been unable, as a practical matter, to have negotiated a license before making the
investment. Conversely, a company that knowingly copies highly innovative
technology from a nonpracticing entity is probably not a victim of licensing
failure. These considerations might be squeezed into the “balance of hardships”
and “public interest” prongs of the eBay analysis,191 but a fair-use-type analysis
would accommodate innovation-related concerns much more cleanly.
2. Substantial Improvements
Copyright fair use doctrine relies heavily on the extent to which a particular
use is “transformative.”192 The motivation behind this reliance is the intuition that
the public should not be deprived of a major advance because the initial author
refuses to “play along.” The argument is similar in the patent law context and is
the basis for the reverse doctrine of equivalents already discussed at length. In the
patent context, the evaluation of the substantiality of the improvement should also
take into account the size of the technological contribution of the initial innovator.
It is longstanding patent doctrine that a “pioneer” inventor should be afforded a
broad scope of equivalents in assessing infringement.193 That doctrine, like the
reverse doctrine of equivalents, had its roots in central claiming and is somewhat
difficult to apply under the present peripheral claiming system.194 It can be quite
sensibly taken into account in a fair-use-type analysis, however, where the relative
sizes of the initial invention and improvement are relevant to how the returns
from the invention should be divided and indicative of whether there is likely to
be a hold-up problem or licensing breakdown.
There is one major difference between patent law and copyright law that
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1. See also Streur, supra note 89, at 67.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–94.
See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 4, at 2619.
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746 n.13.
Id.
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would seem to obviate the need for a fair-use-type exemption for improvers
except in the most extreme circumstances (where one might suspect a bargaining
breakdown due to holdup). Unlike authors (who are not permitted ex ante to
obtain copyright in unauthorized transformative works),195 improvers on patented
technology can proceed without authorization and are specifically permitted to
obtain patents on their improvements.196 This “blocking patent” doctrine is
assumed to result in the salutary situation in which it is in both parties’ interests to
come to terms, cross license their patents, and proceed to make use of the
improved technology. The expectation that this will ordinarily occur is probably
behind the present, rather dusty, status of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
Unless there is some reason to think that initial and follow-on inventors cannot
come to terms, why confer a fair use defense on the improver? Thus, a likelihood
of “blocking patent failure” would strongly increase the force of an argument for
an exemption for a substantial improver.
While O’Rourke argues that fair use analysis should consider the possibility
of blocking patent failure due to difficulties of valuation, especially where there is
potential for holdup due to large disparities in the values of the contributions
made by initial and follow-on inventors,197 recent developments provide much
stronger reasons to anticipate that the blocking patent doctrine may not be
sufficient to protect the substantial improver. First, the blocking patent doctrine
assumes that the improver is able and willing to patent the improvement. As
discussed above, this may not be the case for many of those involved in new
innovation paradigms. User innovators may not have the resources to patent their
improvements or may belong to communities in which free revealing rather than
patenting is the norm.198 Open source software developers may have
nonpecuniary motivations that preclude (and would be dampened by) applying for
patents.199 In many cases in which a widespread group of contributors undertakes
highly cumulative innovation, patent protection is simply unavailable either in
principle or as a practical matter.
If patenting is inconsistent with the innovation paradigm that produces the
improvement, the blocking patent doctrine breaks down. Assuming the
improvement is disclosed, as it often will be under new innovation paradigms, the
initial inventor can freely use the improvement, while retaining the right to sue the
improver for patent infringement. In such circumstances, the initial inventor has
no reason to come to terms—even if the improvement is a major advance. Fair

195. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2010).
196. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
197. O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1204.
198. See sources, supra note 114, and references therein.
199. See, e.g., Karim Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
4425-03 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=443040.
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use for the improver may be a socially desirable means to solve this breakdown.
Second, the blocking patent doctrine is less effective where the “improver” is
an independent inventor and/or the initial inventor is a nonpracticing entity.
Having invested heavily in marketing a product or using a process that is only later
determined to infringe an earlier patent, the substantial improver may be subject
to holdup issues similar to those discussed in Section IV(a)(1)(c) above.
Additionally, if the initial patentee is not locked by up-front investment into using
the improvement (or never intends to practice either patent), the improver again
may be subject to holdup.

3. Alternative Innovation Paradigms
As I have argued elsewhere in the context of user innovation,200 the
availability of non-patent-motivated innovation paradigms for a particular
technology weakens the argument for patent exclusivity because it changes the
cost-benefit tradeoffs. Thus, if user innovation (or some other non-patent-based
paradigm) predominates either in a particular case or in the field of the invention
that fact should weigh in favor of an infringement exemption. The extent to which
an exemption should be favored also depends on the extent to which the
alternative innovation paradigm leads to disclosure and dissemination of
inventions. Open source software, for example, is non-patent-motivated, widely
disclosed, and widely disseminated. The prevalence of open source approaches in
a particular technological area weighs in favor of an infringement exemption. User
innovation is frequently non-patent-motivated, but whether it is widely disclosed
and disseminated will depend on whether the invention is self-disclosing or could
be kept as a trade secret, whether it can be easily “picked up” by other users once
disclosed, whether there are norms of free revealing among a particular group of
users and so forth. In a fair-use-type approach, the availability and nature of
alternative innovation paradigms should factor into determining whether an
infringement exemption is appropriate.
B. Fair Use for Independent Inventors, Other Noncopyists, and “Innocent” Copyists
When an accused infringer is an independent inventor or other noncopyist,
there are additional factors that could weigh in favor of an infringement
exemption. First, as already discussed,201 the fact of independent invention itself
weighs in favor of an exemption. As noted, however, noncopyists are not all alike
and neither are copyists. To avoid some of the potential for overreaching of a
strict independent inventor defense (and to deal with other noncopyists and with
“innocent” copyists who copy without knowledge of the patent), one should
200.
201.

Strandburg, Users as Innovators, supra note 29.
See discussion text accompanying notes 133‒40, supra.
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consider the circumstances of any infringement that occurs without knowledge of
the patent.
Besides considering whether the infringer is an independent inventor, it is
also sensible to consider to what extent the infringer’s ignorance of the patent was
reasonable under the circumstances. Relevant circumstances would include patent
search costs (which will depend upon the technological area, as discussed above),
custom within a particular industry (which may be evidence of search costs or of
norms of reciprocal forbearance), the extent to which the infringer should have
been able to foresee the possibility of infringing the patent at issue (which may be
related to the fuzziness of claim boundaries), and the extent to which a particular
infringer could reasonably be expected to have the sophistication and funds to
undertake the necessary patent search (which may be related to whether the
infringer is a commercial or nonprofit entity or a small entity or individual).
Consideration of context is important to avoid encouraging “head in the sand”
behavior by potential infringers and to determine whether an infringement
exemption is appropriate for those who are neither knowing copyists nor true
independent inventors.
C. Summary of Patent Fair Use 2.0 Proposal
The above analysis leads to the following proposed factors for courts to
consider in determining whether to award an infringement exemption (or
alternatively to refrain from awarding an injunction and impose an ongoing
royalty):
1. Is there a justifiable failure to purchase or license due to:
a. The social value of making the invention available to a
market that the patentee will not be able to serve, such as
those who are unable to pay or those for whom the
transaction costs of licensing are prohibitive (taking into
account the potential damage to the patentee’s interests by
arbitrage);
b. An “anti-patent” license failure due to the patentee’s
attempt to squelch further innovation or to exert control
over markets beyond the scope of the claims; or
c. A failure to license due to anticommons-type holdup?
2. Did the infringer make a substantial improvement over the
patentee’s invention and was there some reason for blocking patent
failure?
3. Does the availability of alternative innovation paradigms in the
technological arena provide evidence of reduced importance of
patent incentives?
4. Was the infringer a knowing copyist, independent inventor, or
something in between? If the infringer was not a knowing copyist,
was her failure to locate the patent through search reasonable in
light of patent search costs in the particular technology, custom in
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the industry, the foreseeability of infringement, and the infringer’s
commercial, noncommercial, or small entity status?

D. Applications
To breathe some life into the proposed fair use 2.0 analysis, this section
briefly discusses two possible applications: open source software and essential
medicines.
1. Open Source Software
There has been considerable concern about the vulnerability of open source
software to patent infringement liability, which could arise either as a result of
independent invention or because one of a myriad of widely distributed
contributors inserts infringing code into an open source project.202 Under current
law, there is no likely defense to such a claim203 and while the eBay v. MercExchange
approach might undercut a request for injunctive relief from a nonpracticing
entity, it is not at all clear that courts would refuse to enjoin an open source
program if a software company marketing a competing product were to sue. On
the other hand, applying the fair-use-type factors proposed here would exempt
open source software in most cases, as follows:
1) Is there a justifiable failure to purchase or license?
This factor may not weigh strongly in favor of open source software that
infringes patents held by companies marketing competing products, though the
fact that open source software is available to everyone at no charge is somewhat
favorable. Of course, in particular cases, this factor may have more weight.
2) Did the infringer make a substantial improvement over the patentee’s invention and was
there some reason for blocking patent failure?
The analysis of this factor will depend upon the extent to which the open
source software is innovative beyond the patentee’s claims. If there is a substantial
improvement, this factor is strongly in favor of an exemption for the open source
software since the inability of the open source community to patent its
202. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37 (2006) (raising this question and discussing it in the context of litigation
in which SCO Group sued IBM, contending that Linux contained some lines of proprietary code);
Joe Mutschelknaus, Spillover Effect: Investigating Patent Implications to Open-Source Software Copyright
Licensing, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 409 (2009–10) (discussing how the GPL attempts to deal with patent
issues); John Tsai, For Better or Worse: Introducing the GNU General Public License Version 3, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 547 (2008); Greg Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
563, 593 (2004).
203. Though some have suggested that an infringement exemption for open source software
be considered. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 140.
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improvements leads to a complete blocking patent failure.
3) Does the availability of alternative innovation paradigms in the technological arena
provide evidence of reduced importance of patent incentives?
This factor will generally weigh strongly in favor of exempting the open
source software unless there is evidence that open source is not playing an
important role in innovation in the particular arena.
4) Was the infringer a knowing copyist, independent inventor, or something in between? If
the infringer was not a knowing copyist, was her failure to locate the patent through search
reasonable?
This factor will probably favor exemption since the open source community
likely invented independently. Even if a contributor knowingly contributed
patented code, it may be unreasonable to expect the core developers to police
such infringement.204 Moreover, it would in most cases be unreasonable to expect
participants in an emergent and modular innovation paradigm such as open source
software to conduct patent searches and attempt patent clearance. As already
discussed, the information technology arena is one in which even commercial
players have found it prohibitively difficult to conduct patent searches.
The proposed fair use-type exemption thus would probably apply to most
open source projects. Adopting such an exemption would therefore remove the
shadow of potential infringement liability from such projects. Note, however, that
the exemption would not be automatic. If an open source project blatantly and
knowingly copied patented code, encouraged its contributors to ignore patents
when making their contributions, and so forth, it would not be eligible for the
exemption. The proposal thus has advantages over a bright line “open source”
defense.205
2. Essential Medicines
The problem of access to medicine is hugely important in the international
arena and has inspired a correspondingly vast literature.206 Here I do not attempt
to engage that literature seriously. This analysis simply illustrates how the
proposed factors would apply in the context of a domestic patent infringement
case against a very low cost provider of essential medicines to those with very low

204. The issues here would be comparable to those that arise in considering the liability of
internet service providers for infringement, an issue dealt with in the copyright context by “safe
harbor” provisions. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010).
205. See Garrison, supra note 140.
206. See, for a small taste, Symposium, Global Access to Health: Legal, Business, and Policy Obstacles,
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (2008); Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1047 (2009); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 155 (2009).
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incomes. I will assume in this discussion that the infringer is a nonprofit entity and
consider whether there might be workable models for tailoring provision of
essential medicines so as to qualify for a “patent fair use” exemption.
1) Is there a justifiable failure to purchase or license?
Where patients are in need of essential medicines and unable to afford them,
there is a very strong social benefit to providing those medicines. The rub, of
course, is the arbitrage problem, in which medications supplied or produced for
use by low income patients might be redirected “under the table” to higher
income patients. Rather than simply assume in the abstract that gray market goods
are a problem, an ex post fair-use-type analysis would permit a factual
investigation of whether the institutional arrangements for providing a particular
infringing drug were in fact creating a sizable opportunity for arbitrage. So, for
example, if generic essential medications were administered at clinics operated by
nonprofit entities with reasonably strict standards for patient income, rather than
provided directly to patients for use at home, or were prepared in some way to
differentiate them from brand name drugs so as to discourage corrupt behavior by
the provider, these facts would weigh in favor of an exemption.
2) Did the infringer make a substantial improvement over the patentee’s invention and was
there some reason for blocking patent failure?
This factor would not favor an exemption with respect to patented essential
medicines in many circumstances, since the generic would often essentially
duplicate the brand name drug. One could imagine cases where this factor might
come into play, however. Suppose, for example, that a new use for a brand-name
drug in treating an illness endemic to low-income patients was discovered by
nonprofit researchers or doctors treating low-income patients. The brand-name
company would have had little incentive to develop such a new use, since there is
little profit to be made from it. For the same reason, the blocking patent doctrine
would be of little help in providing incentives for cross-licensing.
3) Does the availability of alternative innovation paradigms in the technological arena
provide evidence of reduced importance of patent incentives?
This factor will generally weigh strongly against infringement exemptions in
the pharmaceutical arena since pharmaceutical innovation is strongly dependent
on very expensive private investment, at least under the current regulatory system.
This might conceivably change in the future, since various experiments with
“open source drug development” are underway.207 However, the costs of clinical
trials for approval of new drugs are likely to constrain the potential for such open
207.

See, e.g., Marden, supra note 111. See also BIOENDEAVOR: ENABLING OPEN INNOVATION
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011).

IN THE LIFE SCIENCES, http://www.bioendeavor.net
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source approaches, at least within the United States.208 Once again, though, the
situation might be different at some point with respect to the development of new
uses of existing drugs.209
4) Was the infringer a knowing copyist, independent inventor, or something in between? If
the infringer was not a knowing copyist, was her failure to locate the patent through search
reasonable?
This factor will typically weigh against an exemption, since we are postulating
the use of a known, patented drug. At least with respect to patents on the
chemical entity, search is generally not a serious problem for pharmaceuticals.210
The bottom line of such an analysis will probably favor the patentee most of
the time. But the analysis suggests room for creativity on the part of organizations
seeking to serve those who are unable to pay for essential medicines because the
analysis is sensitive to the facts on the ground with respect to the issue of gray
market goods. A fair-use approach thus might provide a path out of the stalemate
caused by attempts to balance the value of essential medicines to those who
cannot afford them against the value of as-yet-uninvented future medicines.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has attempted to update the inquiry into the wisdom of “patent
fair use” to account for the evolution of technology and of inventive paradigms in
the years since O’Rourke’s seminal treatment of the issue in 2000. I have argued
that a fair-use-type ex post approach to cabining patent exclusivity is even more
attractive as a theoretical matter now than it was in 2000. I have also suggested a
set of “patent fair use 2.0” factors that would be relevant to such an exemption:

208. See, e.g., Marden, supra note 111, at 234 (discussing the high costs of drug development).
Some have also proposed shifting responsibility for clinical trials away from the private sector. See, e.g.,
Dean Baker, The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs (2008), available at
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-benefits-and-savings-of-publicly-fundedclinical-trials-of-prescription-drugs (last visited Sept. 28, 2011); Arjun Jayadev & Joseph Stiglitz, Two
Ideas to Increase Innovation and Reduce Pharmaceutical Costs and Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS 28, Web Exclusive
(2008): w165-w168, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.28.1.w165v1.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011); Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
264 (2009), Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public Funding and
Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 4, no. 1 (2007), 1–4, available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi /viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=ev (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
Any major changes in the regulatory paradigm could affect the viability of open and collaborative
innovation approaches to pharmaceutical innovation, as could major scientific or technical advances
that reduced the costs.
209. See, e.g., Curtis R. Chong & David J. Sullivan, New Uses for Old Drugs, 448 NATURE 645
(2007) (describing the Johns Hopkins Clinical Compound Screening Initiative); Harold J. DeMonaco,
Ayfer Ali, & Eric von Hippel, The Major Role of Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug Therapies, 26
PHARMACOTHERAPY 323 (2006); Stephen M. Maurer, Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding a Niche (Or
Maybe Several), 76 UMKC L. REV. 405 (2007).
210. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 18.
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(1) Is there a justifiable failure to purchase or license due to the social value of
serving an underserved market (taking into account the potential damage to the
patentee’s interests by arbitrage), “anti-patent” license failure due to the patentee’s
attempt to squelch further innovation or to exert control over markets beyond the
scope of the patent, or failure to license due to anticommons-type holdup? (2) Did
the infringer make a substantial improvement over the patentee’s invention and
was there some reason for blocking patent failure? (3) Does the availability of
alternative innovation paradigms in the technological arena provide evidence of
reduced importance of patent incentives? (4) Was the infringer a knowing copyist,
independent inventor, or something in between? If the infringer was not a
knowing copyist was her failure to locate the patent through search reasonable in
light of patent search costs in the particular technology, custom in the industry,
the foreseeability of infringement, and the infringer’s commercial, noncommercial,
or small entity status?
While this Article has been primarily in the nature of a thought experiment
about optimal doctrine, it is obviously important to consider whether any of this is
at all practical. Could the judiciary implement a fair-use-type exemption? The fair
use exemption in copyright, though later codified, began in just that way,211 as did
the limits on patentable subject matter in patent law,212 which arise from similar
policy concerns. So it might be possible in principle for judges to make such a
move. At this point, however, a wholesale move to a fair-use-type exemption by
the judiciary seems highly unlikely. A statutory fair-use-type exemption is perhaps
more likely, but only just so. Failing that, what can we hope to obtain from a
discussion such as this one? First, the law regarding the award of injunctions
under the eBay decision is only beginning to develop. The analysis here could
inform how courts interpret the “balance of hardships” and “public interest”
prongs of the test. Second, there will continue to be proposals for, and occasional
enactment of, more limited exemptions in various contexts. While limited
exemptions may not be optimal, the factors here can provide guidance both in
evaluating the need for a particular limited exemption and in designing its
implementation. For example, the analysis suggests how one might design an
independent inventor-type exemption that might avoid some of the over- and
under coverage of a bright line rule. Finally, a conversation about the analytical
basis for infringement exemptions can help to illuminate commonalities among
proposals for specific exemptions, as in the example of business methods and
research tools discussed above.

211. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(articulating that 17 § U.S.C. 107 codifies the traditional “fair use” privilege).
212. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing the history of the ban
on patent “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”).

